Mostrando postagens com marcador Medical Errors. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Medical Errors. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2018

Information Technology




Problems with health information technology and their effects on care delivery and patient outcomes: a systematic review

Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, Volume 24, Issue 2, 1 March 2017, Pages 246–250, https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocw154




Objective: To systematically review studies reporting problems with information technology (IT) in health care and their effects on care delivery and patient outcomes.

Materials and methods: We searched bibliographic databases including Scopus, PubMed, and Science Citation Index Expanded from January 2004 to December 2015 for studies reporting problems with IT and their effects. A framework called the information value chain, which connects technology use to final outcome, was used to assess how IT problems affect user interaction, information receipt, decision-making, care processes, and patient outcomes. The review was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement.

Results: Of the 34 studies identified, the majority (n = 14, 41%) were analyses of incidents reported from 6 countries. There were 7 descriptive studies, 9 ethnographic studies, and 4 case reports. The types of IT problems were similar to those described in earlier classifications of safety problems associated with health IT. The frequency, scale, and severity of IT problems were not adequately captured within these studies. Use errors and poor user interfaces interfered with the receipt of information and led to errors of commission when making decisions. Clinical errors involving medications were well characterized. Issues with system functionality, including poor user interfaces and fragmented displays, delayed care delivery. Issues with system access, system configuration, and software updates also delayed care. In 18 studies (53%), IT problems were linked to patient harm and death. Near-miss events were reported in 10 studies (29%).

Discussion and conclusion: The research evidence describing problems with health IT remains largely qualitative, and many opportunities remain to systematically study and quantify risks and benefits with regard to patient safety. The information value chain, when used in conjunction with existing classifications for health IT safety problems, can enhance measurement and should facilitate identification of the most significant risks to patient safety.


domingo, 31 de dezembro de 2017

Segurança do paciente



6 metas internacionais de segurança do paciente

Conheça os princípios de uma assistência à saúde segura e de qualidade: as 6 metas internacionais


1
Identificação do paciente 
 
 
Evitar que procedimentos e administração de medicamentos sejam feitos em pacientes errados, garantindo a identificação correta do paciente. “A identificação do paciente é importante para prevenção de erros e complicações decorrentes da entrega de procedimentos, resultados de exames, medicação, dentre outros, ao paciente errado”, define Márcia Martins, diretora técnica da divisão de enfermagem do Hospital das Clínicas. “Além disso, norteia a equipe nos procedimentos a serem realizados para a conferência da identificação do paciente em todas as etapas do cuidado”, completa.
 
 
2
Comunicação efetiva
 
 
Evitar que informações sobre os cuidados do paciente sejam perdidas ou trocadas, melhorando a efetividade da comunicação entre os profissionais da saúde." O uso de códigos padronizados de diagnósticos, procedimentos, símbolos, abreviaturas e definições deve ser implementado e monitorado para evitar erros de comunicação e erros em potencial", diz Rima Farah é Enfermeira, mestre em Avaliação pela Fundação Cesgranrio, especialista em Administração e Organização Hospitalar pela Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e supervisora de Educação e Projetos do Consórcio Brasileiro de Acreditação (CBA).
 
3
Uso de medicamentos
 
 
Evitar erros de prescrição e administração de medicação aos pacientes, fazendo o uso seguro de medicamentos. "A função do farmacêutico no ambiente hospitalar é fundamentalmente aumentar a segurança na utilização de medicamentos no cenário hospitalar, reduzindo a ocorrência de eventos adversos envolvendo o uso dos medicamentos. Além disso, um dos desafios é estabelecer cuidado centrado no paciente e ser referência para a equipe multiprofissional", diz Lívia Maria Gonçalves Barbosa, farmacêutica especialista em UTI do Hospital Sírio-Libanês, em São Paulo, e coordenadora da Comissão Assessora de Farmácia Clínica no CRF SP.
 
4
Cirurgia Segura
 
 
Evitar erros antes, durante e depois de cirurgias, garantindo as condições de uma cirurgia segura. "Para minimizar o dano ao paciente em cirurgias, é importante que haja a garantia de que o check-list de Verificação de Segurança seja realizado, assegurando que as etapas pré, trans e pós-operatórias sejam cumpridas de maneira oportuna e eficiente", reforça Renata Barco, gerente do Bloco Operatório e Centro de Endoscopia do Hospital Alemão Oswaldo Cruz.
 
5
Higiene das mãos
 
 
Evitar infecções hospitalares, promovendo uma corretar higiene das mãos pelos profissionais. A higienização das mãos é um procedimento básico essencial na prevenção das IRAS. "É uma medida simples que compreende a lavagem de mãos com agua e sabão ou higienização com formulação alcoólica", diz Dra. Regia Damous, infectologista do Hospital e Maternidade São Luiz Itaim.
 
6
Reduzir quedas e lesão por pressão
 
 
Evitar quedas e lesões por pressão nos ambientes hospitalares, garantindo uma assistência de qualidade. "O importante é evitar que a queda aconteça”, diz José Eduardo Pompeu, que é Fisioterapeuta pela USP e doutor e mestre em Neurociências pela Universidade de São Paulo. "O desenvolvimento de lesão por pressão é um indicador de qualidade da assistência, por isso, as instituições que controlam este indicador elaboram protocolos de prevenção”, diz Fernanda Marchiori, enfermeira estomaterapeuta e líder do grupo de prevenção de úlcera por pressão do Hospital São Camilo, de São Paulo



domingo, 23 de julho de 2017

Medical errors




Physicians need to openly discuss medical mistakes and near misses


Sara Scarlet




Like many surgical problems, compartment syndrome must be recognized rapidly. Failing to do so may lead to a patient’s losing function in a limb, losing the limb altogether, and, in extreme cases, dying. A physician-in-training I work with missed it. Her error made me realize that medicine is suffering from its own largely unrecognized compartment syndrome.

Late one night, an emergency physician at an outside hospital called the attending physician on my hospital’s burn surgery service about a patient whose arm had been badly burned. After a brief discussion, they agreed to transfer the patient to our hospital. The trainee admitted the patient to the hospital.

Somehow, the emergency medicine physician, the burn surgeon on call, the nurses, and the trainee all missed the harbingers of compartment syndrome — the tight burned skin, the fixed deformity of the hand, and the severe pain the patient was experiencing. This dangerous condition occurs when pressure inside a confined body space builds up as a result of internal bleeding or swelling. The increase in pressure prevents blood from flowing to the area. If compartment syndrome isn’t detected in time and treated, the limb can become permanently damaged, or may even need to be amputated.

Failing to recognize the urgency of the situation, the trainee didn’t wake me to discuss the case. Instead, she waited until the day team arrived to discuss the patient. That meant her condition went unrecognized for several hours and her care was significantly delayed.

I learned about the case that morning. Devastated by the number of clinicians who had missed the warning signs, I imagined the patient lying in her hospital bed with agonizing pain in her arm as it was starved of oxygen.

Fortunately, she escaped permanent damage and eventually left the hospital with normal function in her arm — what we in medicine call a “near miss.”

The next time the trainee was working in the hospital, I sent her a page to call me so we could debrief.

Her voice cracked nervously as she said hello. We exchanged the usual pleasantries. Her next words came as a shock. “Are you calling to yell at me?”

“No,” I said, “we need to talk about how we can all do better next time.”

We discussed the details of the case and reviewed compartment syndrome. I thought the conversation was going well. But then the intern surprised me by asking, “Am I going to get fired?”

That fearful question echoed the hidden curriculum of punitive responses to error that pervades the culture of medicine. It’s especially strong in surgery, where we tend to work apart from peers. With that isolation, it is easy to assume that others are somehow infallible, and that our personal errors are egregiously unique.


We must all recognize that putting an end to our silent solidarity about errors will empower us to provide better care.


What many trainees fail to recognize early in their careers is that errors usually aren’t the fault of a single clinician. Instead, they represent the failure of a much larger system of defenses, barriers, and safeguards. In the case of our patient with compartment syndrome, the error was on behalf of the entire medical team.

I shared with the trainee a story of a mistake of mine two years earlier but still vivid in my mind. A patient of mine developed critical limb ischemia — a rapid reduction in blood flow to one of her legs. In order to properly treat her, we planned to perform an angiogram, a procedure to look at the arteries in her leg. I gave her a dose of heparin to prevent her blood from clotting without taking the time to check the results of her previous blood tests. Had I looked, I would have seen that she had been given a dose of heparin the previous day. The extra dose I administered triggered a stroke. I felt extremely responsible for it, and did not leave her bedside for hours to make sure she received the appropriate care.

The next day, the patient thanked me for “my compassion,” her words hanging in the air in the busy intensive care unit. I had never felt so ashamed. Now I recognized the same painful feelings in my young colleague.

Most doctors vividly recall their “cases of regret.” These events undeniably shape our practice. As French surgeon René Leriche wrote in 1951, “Every surgeon carries about him a little cemetery, in which from time to time he goes to pray, a cemetery of bitterness and regret, of which he seeks the reason for certain of his failures.”

Most of these regrets are quite private. As Dr. Danielle Ofri reflected in her essay “My Near Miss” on her experiences with errors, “the instinct for most medical professionals is to keep these shameful mistakes to ourselves.” They do this in part to protect themselves. According to the 2013 National Healthcare Quality Report, most health care workers believe that mistakes will be held against them.

Like compartment syndrome, failing to openly discuss errors carries with it the deep, unrelenting pain of guilt, humiliation, and shame. Left unaddressed, these powerful emotions are damaging to our professional and personal lives. In addition, failure to openly acknowledge personal experiences with errors and near misses contributes to a culture of stigma. This kind of avoidance led my colleague to believe that she was the only trainee who had made a mistake, which instilled in her a deep sense of regret and shame.

Keeping medical mistakes in the shadows is bad for individual clinicians and for the medical system, since we can all learn from mistakes. So how do we discuss them with the people who support and mentor us as we navigate through training and beyond? More specifically, how do we communicate how our mistakes make us feel?

We often discuss the appropriate ways to disclose errors to patients: apologize, be honest, and accept responsibility for one’s mistakes. But the medical culture fails to provide an effective platform for us to discuss errors with one another on a more personal level.

Creating a safe environment for discussing errors will help future physicians succeed where others have failed. It will help improve our health care systems, create a culture of safety, and work to eliminate the damaging culture of stigma.

The standard morbidity and mortality (M&M) conference is supposed to offer clinicians a public forum for presenting medical errors and complications. But these tend to cultivate an atmosphere of detachment — trainees impersonally convey details with an attitude of indifference. The M&M conference generally doesn’t offer the opportunity for discussing what lies deeper.

Debriefing represents an excellent step forward. The purpose of this exercise is to discuss the actions and thought processes surrounding a specific patient care situation, to reflect on them, and to incorporate improvement into future performance. The debrief can be an effective forum for addressing the personal toll of experiencing a serious event.

But I’ve found that in the absence of a sentinel event — an unexpected death or serious injury — debriefing is rare. When the dust settles after an error is made or a patient experiences a complication, we often scurry back to our tasks and deal with the psychological aftershocks alone.

Vulnerability is an integral aspect of leadership, something that all physicians should acknowledge. With vulnerability comes strength. From the novice trainee to the most seasoned surgeon, we must all recognize that putting an end to our silent solidarity about errors will empower us to provide better care for our patients, for each other, and for ourselves.

The nature of our practice and the fact that we are human beings means that we will make mistakes. Bad doctors aren’t the only doctors who make errors; rather, they are the ones who refuse to learn from their mistakes. As many of us in surgery say, “The enemy of good is perfect.”

Sara Scarlet, M.D., is a general surgery resident at the University of North Carolina.


 

terça-feira, 11 de novembro de 2014

Erro médico


Changes in Medical Errors after Implementation of a Handoff Program

Amy J. Starmer, M.D., M.P.H., Nancy D. Spector, M.D., Rajendu Srivastava, M.D., M.P.H., Daniel C. West, M.D., Glenn Rosenbluth, M.D., April D. Allen, M.P.A., Elizabeth L. Noble, B.A., Lisa L. Tse, B.A., Anuj K. Dalal, M.D., Carol A. Keohane, M.S., R.N., Stuart R. Lipsitz, Ph.D., Jeffrey M. Rothschild, M.D., M.P.H., Matthew F. Wien, B.S., Catherine S. Yoon, M.S., Katherine R. Zigmont, B.S.N., R.N., Karen M. Wilson, M.D., M.P.H., Jennifer K. O’Toole, M.D., M.Ed., Lauren G. Solan, M.D., Megan Aylor, M.D., Zia Bismilla, M.D., M.Ed., Maitreya Coffey, M.D., Sanjay Mahant, M.D., Rebecca L. Blankenburg, M.D., M.P.H., Lauren A. Destino, M.D., Jennifer L. Everhart, M.D., Shilpa J. Patel, M.D., James F. Bale, Jr., M.D., Jaime B. Spackman, M.S.H.S., Adam T. Stevenson, M.D., Sharon Calaman, M.D., F. Sessions Cole, M.D., Dorene F. Balmer, Ph.D., Jennifer H. Hepps, M.D., Joseph O. Lopreiato, M.D., M.P.H., Clifton E. Yu, M.D., Theodore C. Sectish, M.D., and Christopher P. Landrigan, M.D., M.P.H. for the I-PASS Study Group

N Engl J Med 2014; 371:1803-1812November 6, 2014DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa1405556

Background

Miscommunications are a leading cause of serious medical errors. Data from multicenter studies assessing programs designed to improve handoff of information about patient care are lacking.

Methods

We conducted a prospective intervention study of a resident handoff-improvement program in nine hospitals, measuring rates of medical errors, preventable adverse events, and miscommunications, as well as resident workflow. The intervention included a mnemonic to standardize oral and written handoffs, handoff and communication training, a faculty development and observation program, and a sustainability campaign. Error rates were measured through active surveillance. Handoffs were assessed by means of evaluation of printed handoff documents and audio recordings. Workflow was assessed through time–motion observations. The primary outcome had two components: medical errors and preventable adverse events.

Results

In 10,740 patient admissions, the medical-error rate decreased by 23% from the preintervention period to the postintervention period (24.5 vs. 18.8 per 100 admissions, P<0.001), and the rate of preventable adverse events decreased by 30% (4.7 vs. 3.3 events per 100 admissions, P<0.001). The rate of nonpreventable adverse events did not change significantly (3.0 and 2.8 events per 100 admissions, P=0.79). Site-level analyses showed significant error reductions at six of nine sites. Across sites, significant increases were observed in the inclusion of all prespecified key elements in written documents and oral communication during handoff (nine written and five oral elements; P<0.001 for all 14 comparisons). There were no significant changes from the preintervention period to the postintervention period in the duration of oral handoffs (2.4 and 2.5 minutes per patient, respectively; P=0.55) or in resident workflow, including patient–family contact and computer time.

Conclusions

Implementation of the handoff program was associated with reductions in medical errors and in preventable adverse events and with improvements in communication, without a negative effect on workflow. (Funded by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and others.)



Supported by grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (1R18AE000029-01), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality/Oregon Comparative Effectiveness Research K12 Program (1K12HS019456-01, to Dr. Starmer), the Medical Research Foundation of Oregon, and the Physician Services Incorporated Foundation (of Ontario, Canada) and by an unrestricted medical education grant from Pfizer.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of any agency of the federal government.

Source Information

From the Department of Medicine, Division of General Pediatrics, Boston Children’s Hospital (A.J.S., T.C.S., C.P.L., A.D.A., E.L.N., L.L.T.), Harvard Medical School (A.J.S., A.K.D., S.R.L., J.M.R., T.C.S., C.P.L.), Center for Patient Safety Research, Division of General Medicine (A.K.D., C.A.K., J.M.R., S.R.L., M.F.W., C.S.Y., K.R.Z.) and Division of Sleep Medicine (C.P.L.), Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and CRICO/Risk Management Foundation (C.A.K.) — all in Boston; the Department of Pediatrics, Doernbecher Children’s Hospital, Oregon Health and Science University, Portland (A.J.S., M.A.); the Department of Pediatrics, Section of General Pediatrics (N.D.S.) and Section of Critical Care (S.C.), St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children, Drexel University College of Medicine, Philadelphia; the Departments of Pediatrics (R.S., J.B.S., A.T.S.) and Neurology (J.F.B.), Primary Children’s Hospital, Intermountain Healthcare, University of Utah School of Medicine, and Institute for Health Care Delivery Research, Intermountain Healthcare (R.S.), Salt Lake City; the Department of Pediatrics, Benioff Children’s Hospital, University of California, San Francisco (D.C.W., G.R.), and the Department of Pediatrics, Division of General Pediatrics, Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital Stanford, Stanford University School of Medicine, Palo Alto (R.L.B., L.A.D., J.L.E., S.J.P.) — both in California; the Department of Pediatrics, Children’s Hospital Colorado, University of Colorado School of Medicine, Aurora (K.M.W.); the Department of Pediatrics, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinnati (J.K.O., L.G.S.); the Department of Paediatrics (Z.B., M.C., S.M.), Centre for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety (M.C.), and Institute for Health Policy, Management and Evaluation (S.M.), Hospital for Sick Children and University of Toronto, Toronto; the Department of Pediatrics, Division of General Pediatrics, Kapi’olani Medical Center for Women and Children and University of Hawai’i John A. Burns School of Medicine, Honolulu, HI (S.J.P.); the Edward Mallinckrodt Department of Pediatrics, St. Louis Children’s Hospital and Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis (F.S.C.); the Department of Pediatrics, Texas Children’s Hospital and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston (D.F.B.); the Department of Pediatrics, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (J.H.H., J.O.L., C.E.Y.) and the Val G. Hemming Simulation Center (J.O.L.), Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD.

Address reprint requests to Dr. Starmer at the Department of Medicine, Division of General Pediatrics, Boston Children’s Hospital, 300 Longwood Ave., Boston, MA 02115, or at .
The members of the I-PASS Study Group are listed in the Supplementary Appendix, available at NEJM.org.

sexta-feira, 20 de julho de 2012

Ética Médica



DEREG de Maringá terá julgamento simulado

O projeto de Educação Médica Continuada do Conselho de Medicina do Paraná promove, no dia 30 de agosto de 2012, um julgamento simulado para médicos e acadêmicos de Medicina da região de Maringá.
O evento tem início às 19h e será realizado no auditório da Delegacia Regional do CRM-PR em Maringá (Rua das Azaléias, 209 – Zona 05. As inscrições para participar devem ser feitas por e-mail com as funcionárias da Delegacia Regional do CRM em Maringá.

Serviço :
Julgamento simulado em Maringá
Data: 30 de agosto de 2012, quinta-feira
Hora: das 19h às 22h
Local: auditório da Delegacia Regional do CRM-PR em Maringá (Rua das Azaléias, 209 – Zona 05. Tel: 44-3224-4329)

quarta-feira, 18 de julho de 2012